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not to deny that God's nature and commands make some things good, bad,
obligatory or wrong which would not be so otherwise; nor to deny that God's
nature and commands make things more good, bad, obligatory, or wrong than
they would be otherwise. My objections are old objections, but an essay in
defence of divine command theory will not carry conviction unless the author
has something to say about them.

God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?, by
Kathryn Tanner. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988. Pp.
196. Cloth $43.95.
THOMAS F. TRACY, Bates College.
Kathryn Tanner's subtle and historically rich study is centrally concerned
with the relations between claims about God's creative sovereignty and
creatures' powers of action. Traditionally, Christians have claimed both that
1) "a radically transcendent God exercises a universal and unconditional
agency," and 2) creatures possess "their own power and efficacy," and in the
case of human beings are "free and therefore responsible for the character of
their lives" (pp. 1-2). Under modern conditions of thought, Tanner contends,
it has become commonplace to assert that these two statements involve a
contradiction. Contemporary theologians uncritically share the modem assumptions that lead to this appearance of inconsistency, and so they seek to
solve the problem by weakening one (typically the first) or both of these
claims. In doing so, they display a "curious forgetfulness about the rules for
proper Christian talk" (p. 5), for there is an earlier and well-established
tradition in theology that embodies rules of speech which, if carefully followed, make it possible to affirm both divine sovereignty and creaturely
agency. Tanner's program, then, is to uncover these rules, display their mutual
consistency, and show how they are distorted or forgotten under the influence
of certain avoidable modem assumptions.
Tanner begins with a chapter on method in which she explains the linguistic
tum of her approach. Statements about God, she contends, are best understood
as instructions about how to talk about God. This move to second order
discourse is not simply a useful device for analyzing theological utterances.
Tanner makes the much stronger claim that this reflects the intrinsic limits
of speech about God. She adopts an agnostic reading of Thomas' distinction
between the res significata and the modus significandi:
Theologians simply assume that what they say about God is meaningful and
true: they have no way of actually specifying what they are talking about (the
res significata of their statements) apart from the meanings of the terms they
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use and it is just those meanings whose applicability to God they admit to
failing to understand (p. 12).

Theological statements are "informationally vacuous," they tell us nothing
about God. They do, however, establish rules for what should and should not
be said of God, and this linguistic practice shapes Christian religious life.
This account of religious language (and this reading of Thomas) faces a
variety of difficulties, and an interest in the regulative functions of theological statements certainly does not commit one to these wider views. On
this account, when we say "God is good," it appears that we are saying
roughly the following: "It is correct for Christians to say 'God is good,'
although we cannot state any positive relation between the meaning of the
predicate' good' when we ascribe it to this subject and when we say of
any other subject that it is good. This statement about God, however, is tied
in certain ways to other Christian statements (spelled out in further theological rules of discourse) and to the practice of Christian life." This predicative
agnosticism bears an uneasy relation to Tanner's concern to show the consistency of Christian claims. For, first, if a 'veil of ignorance' is drawn between
the way we speak of God (the modus) and the referent of that speech (the
res), then it is not clear that we should worry about contradictions in the
former (which need not, after all, signify in God what they signify for us).
On this account one might argue that Christians ought not to be troubled if
they find the right sort of inconsistencies in their utterances, e.g., inconsistencies that result from conjoining elements of first-order Christian discourse
that ordinarily are used to counteract complementary errors in religious practice. This would be a provocative argument to make, but it is not the result
Tanner intends.
Tanner indicates that the rules she will identify are highly formal; materially different theologies, using distinctive vocabularies for talk about God
and the world, should be able to satisfy them. In each case, the rules will
specify how to modify patterns of speech carried over to theology from other
contexts; in particular, certain inferences that might ordinarily be warranted
in non-theological contexts will be blocked when this language is pressed
into theological service. Although these theological rules "fracture" and "violate" the rules of ordinary linguistic practice, they serve to establish "the
coherence of Christian claims that otherwise appear to conflict with one
another" (p. 27).
The first two rules that Tanner states concern God's transcendence and
creative agency. There is a putative contradiction, she contends, between the
claims that 1) "God transcends the world," and 2) "God is directly involved
in the world as its creator" (p. 38). The tension between these assertions,
which she traces in Hellenistic cosmologies, results from defining divine
transcendence "contrastively." When the divine is delineated by contrast with
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the non-divine, God's transcendence and God's involvement with the world
stand in inverse relation to each other. As God's transcendence is emphasized,
God's dealings with the world are restricted, and this "inevitably [brings]
God down to the level of the non-divine" as one limited being among others (p.
46). Christian discourse, Tanner argues, avoided this paradoxical result by following a rule requiring that God's transcendence be defined non-contrastively,
viz., "avoid both simple univocal attribution of predicates to God and world and
a simple contrast of divine and non-divine predicates." This rule is conjoined
with a second: "avoid in talk about God's creative agency all suggestions of
limitation in scope or manner" (p. 47). These two rules are systematically interconnected; we can satisfy the second only if we conform to the first.
These rules playa crucial role throughout Tanner's study. It is worth noting,
therefore, some puzzles about the notion of a non-contrastive account of
transcendence. Are all contrasts between God and world to be denied? Tanner
sometimes speaks this way. God, she suggests, "is not characterized by contrast with any sort of being" (p. 46), and "it is the mutual exclusiveness of
all apparent antitheses ... that must give way before such a God" (p. 79). At
the very least, however, a contrast is asserted between beings that are defined
by some network of contrasts (i.e., finite beings) and that Being who cannot
be so defined. Further, the concept of such a Being is paradoxical if defined
in terms of contrasts as such (viz., the Being, in contrast to all other beings,
who cannot be defined by contrasts) rather than in terms of some particular
contrast or set of contrasts. It follows that the argument will fail which claims
that establishing a contrast between God and the world inevitably leads to
treating God as one limited being among others. The lesson to be learned
from Hellenistic thinkers, it would seem, is not that we should avoid contrasting God and world, but rather that we should be careful about which
contrasts we draw. To say that God is ingenerate does not appear to impose
any limitation on God's activity, wlei\e to say that God is impassible may
impose certain limits. The debate on these questions continues, and there
seems to be little prospect of ending it with the claim that all such contrasts
entail impermissible limitations. On at least one reading, therefore, the first
rule does not constitute a necessary condition for satisfying the second.
Given these basic rules of Christian discourse, Tanner turns to the central
question of her study: if God's agency in the created world is universal,
unconditioned, and immediate, can creatures exercise powers of their own
and, in at least some actions, be free? The first two rules, she argues, entail
the subsidiary rule that creatures exist in "total and immediate dependence
upon God" (p. 84). This has as its correlate the principle that every action of
creatures, including free intentional action, is founded in God's prior agency
"directly and in toto-in power, exercise, manner of activity and effect" (p.
86). Divine and created agencies are not in competition, as though one must
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give way to make room for the other. Rather the actions of God and of
creatures occur on two different levels-the vertical and the horizontal, or
the primary and the secondary-that are reflected in separate "orders of
predication." The statement that an event is contingent or that it is a free
intentional action does not conflict with "the creature's complete determination by God's creative agency." For talk of contingency and freedom "simply
concern[s] the nature of the relation between created beings and their created
effects" on the horizontal level (p. 90). An effect in the world can be entirely
attributed to God's primary causality and to the creature's secondary causality, for God's creative agency brings about the existence, operation, and effect
of 'the finite agent. These reflections lead to several more subsidiary rules,
the heart of which is that God's agency must in no way be conditioned by
creatures, e.g., by operating among creaturely causes as a partial or contributing cause (p. 94), by affecting creatures' actions rather than by effecting
them (p. 95), or by adapting the divine activity to the independent or opposed
actions of creatures (p. 96).
Is this broadly Thomistic picture sufficient to demonstrate the compatibility
of divine sovereignty with the causal powers of creatures and with human
freedom? There seem to be, on this view, real causal relations among creatures. The more difficult question concerns the freedom of finite agents, and
one's answer will depend upon what sort of freedom one thinks it important
to claim in Christian theology. Tanner is right that the divine "vertical"
determination of a finite agent's intentional action is compatible with that act
being free on the "horizontal" level. One can affirm an incompatibilism that
is restricted to the creatu~ely context of action, i.e., an agent's free actions
are not determined by the prior history of the world and the laws of nature.
But is this enough? God's immediate creative agency brings about not only
my ongoing existence as an agent with the capacity to make choices, it also
brings about my choices. Although God does not act alongside or among
secondary agencies to cause me to act as I do, God's primary activity constitutes me as the agent who performs these acts. God's creative will includes
each of my choices, and God's will infallibly effects what it intends. Tanner
acknowledges that there is an important sense in which the finite agent is not,
on this account, "really free to do otherwise" (p. 178, n. II). But she contends
that the interest in claiming some stronger freedom for finite agents reflects
the distorting influences of modernity and brings with it the breakdown of
coherent Christian discourse. Against this, however, there appear to be considerations internal to Christianity that might lead to the affirmation of such
creaturely freedom, even if one resists the enchantment of Enlightenment
claims about autonomy or of deistic pictures of a world that gets along alright
on its own. For example, one might wonder how, on the account Tanner gives,
we are to explain the Christian claim that in sin the creature's will has come
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to be at odds with God's will. Thomists have various strategies of response
to this question, of course. But a theologian who is not convinced of the
adequacy of these responses might be led to affirm that part of God's creative
purpose for us is to grant us a limited freedom in relation to God as well as
to one another. When talk of such freedom is motivated in this way, it is far
from clear that it reflects a "theologically inexplicable" (p. 145) departure
from the basic rules of Christian discourse.
Given the limits of space, I have not commented here on Tanner's use of
materials from the history of theology to illustrate her points. Her interweaving of themes from Aquinas and Barth is particularly noteworthy, and she
provides illuminating commentary on a number of past disputes (e.g., between Molina and Banez). One of the special contributions of this book is
that it provides an outstanding model for the use of historical materials in
exploring issues of contemporary importance in philosophical theology.

Explanation/rom Physics to Theology: An Essay ill Rationality and Religion,
by Philip Clayton. New Haven: Yale University, 1989. Pp. ix and 230.
$26.50. ISBN 0-300-0435308.
NANCEY MURPHY, Fuller Theological Seminary.
Philip Clayton's Explanation from Physics

to

Theology is an intriguing book.

It pursues a worthy goal in a highly competent manner. The goal is to counter

the tendency of modern liberal theology to take theological assertions as
anything but assertions (as expressions of religious feeling, or existential
orientation, or as moral recommendations) by showing theology to be enough
like science that whatever truth value science has must accrue to theology as
well. He begins with an account of the history of philosophy of the natural
sciences, since these are taken to be our best examples of rational explanation
and warranted assertability. He then turns to the social sciences, whose concern with questions of meaning has long been said to require an entirely
different methodology. However, he concludes that the differences have been
exaggerated-in both cases the essence of science is providing explanations.
These must fit the explanandum into an accepted framework, and must be
evaluated by means of a coherence criterion. This move puts him in a position
to tackle religion, whose cognitive component is understood as a system of
beliefs by means of which individuals and communities attempt to give meaning to the whole of experience. Theology, then, is a discipline that seeks to
discover and interpret systems of religious meaning and to assess the truth
of the religion's theory about ultimate reality according to the canons of
scientific explanation.

